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ABSTRACT: The simplest statement of the relationship between consensus and dissensus is that arguments 
are supposed to begin in dissensus and end in consensus. This essay introduces a third state for 
argumentation, learned ignorance. Nicolas of Cusa’s De Docta Ignorantia (1440) lays out both a case and a 
logic for argumentation that is not designed to end in a clear conclusion. Instead, the arguer pursues a 
matter up to an inconclusive point, and ends there, satisfied with the results. The underlying logic of this 
view is centered on the “coincidence of opposites,” which requires rejection of the usual logical principle 
that A and not-A cannot both be true. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In theorizing argumentation, scholars have worked out several theories of stasis, which is 
a “resting point” or critical issue whose resolution will decisively turn the argument 
toward one conclusion or another. These stases are all internal to the argument in the 
sense that they refer to different points along an argument’s trajectory. When we analyze 
the beginning and ending states of arguments, however, our literature seems to admit only 
two theoretically interesting circumstances, consensus and dissensus. The aim of this 
essay is to nominate a third such state, learned ignorance, to scholarly attention.  
 In developing this theme, I will begin by examining common views of consensus 
and dissensus, and then move on to learned ignorance, an idea championed in Nicholas of 
Cusa’s De Docta Ignorantia (1440), a treatise of mystical theology. In the final section of 
the essay, I will attempt to move his theological position into the more mundane world of 
everyday arguing. 
 
2. CONSENSUS AND DISSENSUS 
 
Some theorists explicitly propose, and far more scholars tacitly assume, that the purpose 
and natural course of good argumentation is to achieve consensus among the disputing 
parties. Arguments need to begin on ground common to the arguers, of course. They need 
to share various factual understandings of the world, must have a common language, and 
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need to have some way of cooperatively connecting their general values and 
understandings of what counts as an acceptable argument (Brockriede 1975; Fogelin 
2005). While obviously important, these agreements on starting points are not ordinarily 
what is meant by consensus, as I use the term here. 
 Instead, consensus is held out as the desired end state of a successful argument, a 
final agreement on the main point of dispute. It is displayed as free and mutual 
endorsement of the whole argument’s conclusion. This endorsement is expected to be the 
outcome of working through the various supporting ideas for that conclusion, and so 
consensus also involves acceptance by at least one party of matters that were not 
originally congenial. In our community, we concentrate on adherence to the content of 
the arguments rather than their emotional or sociological surround, although there are 
some welcome expansions of that focus (e.g., Gilbert 1997). 
 In certain theories, this commitment to consensus is explicit (e.g., van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 1983; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969). Implicit commitment is 
apparent in the many conceptualizations of argumentation’s purpose: to persuade, to 
enhance knowledge, or to promote democracy, for instance. These outcomes only occur 
in the face of new adherence. But perhaps most revealing of all is how we describe 
arguments that fail to end in consensus (and we know that this is true of many everyday 
arguments; Vuchinich 1990). We call them “unresolved.” This linguistically marked term 
means that the argument is incomplete or deficient. Occasionally, as with Vuchinich, we 
are comfortable with this outcome; more often, as with Trapp and Hoff (1985), we worry 
about the consequences of being unresolved. But we always notice that the argument has 
not run its theoretically proper course, and is in some important way unfinished. The aim 
of argument, its desired end state, is understood to be consensus.  
 Dissensus, in contrast, is usually regarded as a beginning status for arguing, in 
fact the very state that brings an argument into existence. Arguments begin in 
disagreement (O’Keefe 1977) or doubt (Peirce 1980) or in a question (Meyer 1995). 
Arguments are normally regarded as tools for managing ignorance, uncertainty, or 
conflict. Even when they have other purposes, such as play or identity display, they take 
their form and procedure from the prototype, which is an argument designed to be 
“resolved.” We usually think of argument as a way of bridging the human gap between 
dissensus and consensus. So arguments are considered to begin in dissensus. 
 Several scholars, however, have suggested that dissensus is also a productive 
closing state for an argument. Willard’s (1986) classic essay, “Valuing Dissensus,” 
promoted dissensus as a desirable end for arguing. Dissensus mitigates against 
intellectually coercive homogeneity, it valorizes disagreement, and it establishes a 
tolerant open-minded context for important public debate. Hynes (1991) proposed that 
organizations reconfigure themselves to reduce their inevitable desire for conformity, in 
favour of institutionalizing dissensus of high quality. Both Willard and Hynes wrote as 
though the real value of dissensus is that it will eventually lead to better arguments and 
thus to better consensus. But we can see that in a particular instance, it might well be 
desirable to create dissensus out of harmony, to jolt people into examining their 
assumptions and easy agreements. Even if dissensus is only taken to be a temporary 
resting place for an ongoing controversy, Willard and Hynes see it as a perfectly 
appropriate ending state for a particular argument. 
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 So we normally theorize the beginning stage of argumentation as dissensus. Most 
often we consider that its point is to achieve consensus at the end. These two conditions 
have produced valuable theory. However, there may also be a third way, learned 
ignorance. In the following section, I will summarize this argumentative status in hopes 
of showing that it may well justify scholarly attention as an alternative end state. 
 
3. LEARNED IGNORANCE 
 
Nicholas of Cusa (1401—1464) was a prominent churchman of his time. He was 
eventually a Cardinal, and spent an active career as a church diplomat and participant in 
key governance disputes, such as the disagreement over the relative authority of the Pope 
and church councils conducted at the Council of Basel (1431-1449). Not unused to 
practical matters, he once had the ignominy of having to surrender in an armed conflict 
over whether he or a secular prince should have control of Cusa’s bishopric. He was well 
educated, and received a doctorate in canon law early in his career. He often did legal 
work for Rome. His written works included sermons and treatises on a variety of 
subjects. He has been consistently read, reprinted, and translated throughout the centuries, 
and Cusanus societies in several countries are active in the academy. Perhaps his most 
famous work is De Docta Ignorantia (On Learned Ignorance, 1440), a treatise of 
mystical theology. This book will be my focus here. Bond’s (1997) introduction to the 
volume is useful in summarizing it and putting it into context with Cusa’s other 
theological writings. 
 Perhaps it will be most helpful to start at the end, with book III. Several Christian 
theological matters are, on their face, mysterious. For example, Christ is held to be both 
human and divine. Surely these are contradictories, and both terms cannot simultaneously 
describe the same person or thing. Humans are born and die, for instance, but the divine 
is eternal, without beginning or end. Another example is the Trinity. God is three 
Persons, and also one. But obviously three is greater than one, and so different from it. 
Three persons cannot also be one person. These and other matters fundamental to 
Christianity involve prima facie contradictions, and our unaided reason recoils at them. 
Cusa set out to create a theology, a system of reasoning, that resolves these apparent 
contradictions.  
 His basic principle is called the “coincidence of opposites.” Here, coincidence 
does not mean happenstance; it means that two things, opposite things, coexist in 
intellectual peace, without friction, distinction, or contradiction, with equal truth and 
force. Among the opposites he has in mind are those mentioned just above, human/divine 
and three/one.  
Permitting contraries to coexist without opposition violates logic’s law of 
contradiction, to wit, A and not-A cannot both be true. Cusa was entirely aware of this. 
On learning that his treatise had received criticism, he wrote Apologia Doctae 
Ignorantiae (A Defense of Learned Ignorance, 1449), and there he said, 
 
But when he [the critic, John Wenck] alleges that both the fundamental principle-of-knowledge 
(which is enfolded in the principle ‘every thing either is or is not [the case]’) and all inference are 
destroyed, he is misconceiving. For he fails to notice that learned ignorance is concerned with the 
mind’s eye and with apprehension-by-the-intellect (intellectibilitas)—so that whoever is led to the 
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point of seeing ceases from all discursive reasoning, and his evidence comes from sight. (14; the 
first editorial insertion is mine, the others are Hopkins’) 
 
On confronting mysteries that cannot be resolved by logic or discursive reasoning, Cusa 
recommended that we abandon logic and discourse in favour of direct spiritual sight. This 
gaze can only be directed once logic is exhausted. Intellectibilitas is the last thing one 
achieves, not the first. 
 Learned ignorance is a hard-won state. One pursues enlightenment with reason as 
far as reason will go. In theology, however, one eventually encounters matters that human 
reason will not resolve, and so there we must be guided by the intellect, our spiritual 
intelligence. Letting go of reason requires the embrace of learned ignorance, which is a 
modest condition. It means “to know that we do not know” (De Docta Ignorantia, I.i.4). 
He concluded the first of De Docta Ignorantia’s three books by writing, “. . . the precise 
truth shines forth incomprehensibly in the darkness of our ignorance. This is the learned 
ignorance for which we have been searching . . .” (I.xxvi.89).  
 In the Apologia Cusa displayed awareness that this general idea had been 
proposed by others, including Socrates, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and Augustine 
(for connections between Cusa’s work and the prior work of Pseudo-Dionysius, John 
Scottus Eriugena, and Meister Eckhart, see Duclow, 2006). But his development is 
independent of those earlier writers, and has its own special force and coherence. I will 
try to sketch the outline of his thinking here. 
 Centuries before the invention of calculus, Cusa was deeply involved in thinking 
about limits and infinity, and did so in mathematical terms (De Docta Ignorantia, I.xi.30-
I.xxiii.73). He chose geometry as an entrée into the nature of God because mathematics 
uses abstract symbols, and so is already somewhat purified in the sense that manipulation 
of the symbols involves only the use of reason. In these passages, he considered the line, 
the triangle, the circle, and the sphere. His key move was to contemplate the natures of an 
infinite line, infinite triangle, infinite circle, and infinite sphere. His explanations of why 
all these infinite constructions are equivalent to an infinite line really deserve to be read 
for themselves, but I will summarize his argument about infinite circles here (I.xiii).  
 A finite circle has a center, a diameter, and a circumference. Along the 
circumference, we can cut arcs to examine. In a circle with a small diameter, say a few 
inches, such an arc is obviously and definitely curved. If the diameter increases to a foot, 
we can still perceive the curve but it is less dramatic than for the smaller circle. A circle 
with a diameter of a few miles would also produce a curved arc, of course, but it appears 
less curved, thus straighter, than those of the smaller circles. Any finite circle yields 
curved arcs, but as the diameter and circumference increase, the arc becomes straighter 
and straighter. So Cusa reasoned that the limit for a circle’s arc is a straight line. For an 
infinite circle—one with infinite diameter and infinite circumference—the line defining 
its arcs and circumference is therefore an infinite line. Thus an infinite circle is an infinite 
line. This infinite line is simultaneously the infinite circle’s circumference, diameter, and 
center. Cusa offered similar explanations for why an infinite triangle is an infinite line, 
and why an infinite sphere is, too.  
He took one further important step, arguing that there can only ultimately be one 
infinite line, the maximum infinite line. If there were two or more they would be 
numbered, distinct, and so conceivably comparable, all of which he said is conceptually 
impossible in the realm of the infinite. They would, if they existed, resolve themselves 
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into the one maximum infinite line. The infinite line, after all, is not an actual thing and 
so should not be expected to have the properties of finite lines. 
 Before moving on to other details of Cusa’s theological system, let us pause to 
notice an important thing. Infinite triangles, infinite circles, and infinite spheres are all the 
same thing, infinite lines. Considered in their infinite, unlimited, ultimate state, these are 
not distinct, and so cannot be opposites. They have no relations such as greater and lesser, 
cause and effect, basic and constructed. They coexist in a coincidence of opposites. (This 
last is a questionable sentence. “Coexist” is not quite the right word because it implies 
that two distinct things are present, and a similar objection can be laid against “they.” 
Infinity is just infinity, in Cusa’s thinking.) The fact that neither a finite triangle nor a 
finite sphere seems to be a straight line is just an indication that human reason can only 
lead us so far. Reason takes us right up to the limits of finitude. After that, we must place 
ourselves in a state of learned ignorance. 
 This sort of reasoning—he understood the geometrical arguments to be 
transumptive, or analogical—led Cusa to the conclusion that there is one absolute 
maximum, which is God. This is where all the infinities we can conceive are collected 
into their common essence: the maximum line, the perfect human, anything that is 
purified to its infinite, eternal nature. He said that the maximum is “the absolute one that 
is all things” (I.ii.5). The infinite, absolute maximum is the beginning and end. It can be 
contracted (i.e., projected or realized in a particularized way) to “being,” and being is 
necessary for both being and not-being (I.vi). So being and not-being are another 
coincidence of opposites. He was explicit about how this differs from ordinary 
understandings of knowledge: 
 
[…] it is necessary to reject things that, along with their material accessories, are attained through 
the senses, the imagination, or reason, in order to reach the most simple and most abstract 
understanding, where all things are one; where the line is a triangle, a circle, and a sphere; where 
unity is trinity and trinity is unity; where accident is substance; where body is spirit and motion is 
rest, and so on. (I.viii.27) 
 
The absolute maximum is “where all things are one.” It is God, of course, eternal and 
unavailable to interrogation by logic or the senses. Learned ignorance is the means by 
which faith, allied with reason but finally independent of reason, can join a believer into 
this eternal union.  
 Since our interests are not essentially theological, I will pass over Cusa’s 
explanation of how the universe is a contracted unfolding of the absolute maximum (II), 
as well as his detailed discussion of Christian theological mysteries (III). Instead, I will 
only take note of Cusa’s remarks concerning the implications of the coincidence of 
opposites for some specific argument schemes. Then we will pass into the final section of 
the paper, where I try to apply these principles to ordinary arguing. 
 Cusa’s treatise is itself closely argued, and he made no objections to the use of 
logic and ordinary argument schemes for working out finite matters. However, on 
confronting questions dealing with the absolute maximum, many sorts of argument must 
be abandoned. The most fundamental sort of inadmissible argument is that from 
opposites, of course, since there are no opposites in the absolute maximum. This thesis 
has implications for other argumentative tools as well. 
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 In the absolute maximum, no distinctions remain. Everything coexists in the 
coincidence of opposites. Let me summarize how Cusa expanded this idea in various 
comments that we would construe as being about argument schemes.  
 Since there are no distinctions, naming is inappropriate (I.v.13), especially in 
the case of God (I.xxiv.76). To name a thing is to separate it from everything 
with a different name, and that presupposes distinction.  
 Number also requires distinction, and it further implies the possibility of 
quantitative comparison (I.v.13). Nothing can be counted in the infinite realm. 
It is even wrong to speak of the infinite as being unity, because once the idea 
of one has been introduced, that implies the possibilities of two and three, 
which make no sense in the absolute maximum.  
 Arguments about proportion, making use of relations such as greater and 
lesser, require number and so are nonsensical (I.iii.9). Nothing in the absolute 
maximum is greater or lesser than another thing because nothing is 
distinguished. Thus the absolute maximum is also the absolute minimum, a 
point Cusa repeated often in the book.  
 Cause and effect also presume separation or otherness (I.vii.20). The 
connection between the two things is prior to their causal relation, and that 
connection is unity. So connection is “prior” to causality, and connection is 
eternal.  
 
From Cusa’s point of view, loss of these argumentative resources was no inconvenience, 
because at the absolute maximum we cease to reason anyway. Instead, we must try to 
embrace learned ignorance. De Docta Ignorantia ends with this personal note:  
 
[…] by what I believe was a celestial gift from the Father of Lights […] I was led to embrace 
incomprehensibles incomprehensibly in learned ignorance, by transcending those incorruptible 
truths that can be humanly known” (III.263).  
 
4. LEARNED IGNORANCE IN THE MUNDANE WORLD 
 
In this last section of the essay, I want to explore how Cusa’s ideas about theological 
argument might apply to ordinary discourse. Two ideas in particular seem worth thinking 
about: transcendence and learned ignorance. 
 The coincidence of opposites is a doctrine that transcends differences. For Cusa, 
the transcendence is accomplished when all distinctions disappear and one arrives at 
direct spiritual sight of a unity that cannot be named or described in discourse. I do not 
propose we aim for that sort of outcome in everyday argumentation, but something 
similar has long been noticed as useful. The main difference between mundane 
transcendence and Cusa’s is that we ordinarily strive to transcend differences by arriving 
at an articulable synthesis of what originally appeared to be distinct things. 
 In a basic sense, most arguments aim to join ideas together in a new way. The 
New Rhetoric (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969) laid out four main types of argument: 
quasi-logical arguments, those based on the structure of reality, those establishing the 
structure of reality, and dissociative arguments. The last type takes a single idea and 
shows that it is really two or more things. The others, however, create a transcending 
whole, an argument, out of disparate thoughts: “In the first three chapters [on the first 
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three kinds of argument] we examined connecting links in argumentation that have the 
effect of making interdependent elements that could originally be considered 
independent” (p. 411). All arguments except the dissociative ones are transcendent in the 
sense that they collect distinctions into unity. This “transcendence of distinction” is a 
basic function of argumentation, and justifies our thinking of argument as a transcending 
machine. 
 Argument can also accomplish a more advanced kind of synthesis, one we might 
call “transcendence of opposition.” Here the argument does not simply join up things that 
were previously unrelated (distinct). It unifies things that were thought to be contraries. 
Opposition requires distinction, of course, but it also has contradiction in its essential 
character. A and B are distinct; A and not-A are both distinct and opposed.  
 Burke (1959, p. 337) said that one can transcend disagreement by creating a 
vantage point from which the previously opposing terms “cease to be opposites.” Parson 
(1993) characterized H. Ross Perot’s public appeals as efforts at transcendence. Perot’s 
idea was that as a third party candidate, his presidency would transcend the 
Republican/Democrat opposition that he felt prevented public progress.  
 Current headlines might be read as offering another example. One element held to 
have caused the present economic crisis is the set of economic motivations allowed to 
operate in the financial markets. Consumers tried to profit by taking mortgages they 
could only pay if home equity increased and they were able to flip their houses. Lenders 
made those loans in hopes of quick profit, depending on market forces to reinforce the 
loans’ reliability. Mortgages were bundled, sold, and insured, so that the risks were 
moved away from the lender, in the same way that a bookie lays off bets when they 
become unbalanced. Once the financial crisis occurred, the same profit motivations 
prevented money from moving around. Lenders had so little liquidity that they could not 
afford to take further risks, and few were willing to buy instruments from financial 
institutions to supply those companies with sufficient liquidity. So the many but opposed 
motives—each centering on self-profit—froze the operation of the financial sector.  
Rather than change any of those motives, the current U.S. administration can be 
viewed as trying to transcend them. The idea is to discipline the market by regulation, so 
that the previously opposing motives are made irrelevant in the sense that everyone will 
operate comfortably in a more regulated economy. These are “new rules of the game,” 
needed because “[m]arket discipline failed to constrain dangerous levels of risk-taking 
through the financial system” (Geithner 2009).  
 
This crisis has made clear that certain large, interconnected firms and markets need to be under a 
more consistent, and more conservative regulatory regime. These standards cannot simply address 
the soundness of individual institutions, but must also ensure the stability of the system itself. 
(Geithner 2009) 
 
In other words, the motivating arguments of individual institutions are to be transcended 
by arguments about the whole financial system. The proposed regulations are intended to 
affect local decisions by setting aside private aims in favor of an overriding concern for 
“the stability of the system itself.” Both Geithner’s argument and the policies it supports 
are designed to transcend the variety of often-opposed individual motives in favor of one 
common financial motive.  
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 How, exactly, does transcendence of opposites work? Superficially, what seems to 
be needed is an idea that is somehow higher, perhaps more abstract, than the opposing 
ones. In fact, transcendence of opposites seems to function by discovering a lower, more 
basic thing. A simple example of this is Sherif’s (1958) classic study of intergroup 
hostility. Working with boys at camp, he formed two distinct groups and stimulated 
considerable hostility between them, evidenced by sharp in-group/out-group prejudice. 
Then he created what he called “superordinate goals,” which required the two groups to 
work together to achieve some jointly-desired end, for instance, pulling a truck out of the 
mud so groceries could be bought and the boys could have lunch. Repeated exposure to 
these superordinate goal tasks brought the groups together and eventually erased the 
earlier hostilities and group identifications.  
 Cusa often remarked that the absolute maximum is also the absolute minimum, 
and illustrated this once by saying that “being” is necessary for both being and not-being. 
“Being” is not more abstract than being and not-being; it is fundamental to both ideas. To 
sum up our examples in these terms, we would say that superordinate goals wash out in-
group motivations, that a stable financial system is a value that subordinates private 
desires, and that a third party President can operate on the ground common to both major 
political parties. Transcendence of opposites, then, seems to be a moving downward 
conceptually, a search for common assumptions and ideas basic to both halves of the 
opposition. A transcendent thought permits the coincidence of opposites. 
 Cusa’s second possible lesson for us is the one with which this paper began, 
learned ignorance. I argue that it can be a stable ending point for disagreement, a kind of 
argument resolution, though not one that has attracted much study. To illustrate the nature 
of mundane learned ignorance, let me begin by pointing out some things that are not 
learned ignorance.  
 First, it is not a state of avoidance. Simply refusing to engage a spouse’s request 
to paint the living room is not learned ignorance. Avoidance is not even an argument. 
Walking away does not normally settle anything, though it might permit a disagreement 
to evaporate due its inherent lightness. Avoided arguments are “unresolved,” in our usual 
terminology. 
 Second, learned ignorance is not, as the aphorism has it, “agreeing to disagree.” 
This interpersonal status leaves the disagreement intact. It is merely a polite way of 
declining to talk about something. Here, too, the argument is “unresolved” and deficient 
in some way. 
 Instead, learned ignorance is the state of having satisfied oneself that an argument 
is inherently incapable of being resolved by human reason. An example of this is how 
Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson (1967) dealt with paradoxes derived from problems of 
logical type. A classic example is the liar’s paradox: “I am lying.” The statement is true if 
it is false, and false if it is true. Working at this level, the paradox is irresolvable. Only by 
understanding the distinction between a statement and a statement about a statement can 
one pass through the fallacy. But this understanding does not generate a solution to the 
question, Is this true or false? The advanced comprehension of logical types does not 
settle the original issue; it makes the question go away. This is an example of learned 
ignorance.  
 Besides the especially clear example of paradox, we can find ordinary situations 
that resemble it. A theist and atheist may have such contradictory commitment stores that 
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no way can be found to resolve their disagreement. We should state this even more 
strongly: their argument is inherently unavailable to joint rational solution. A biologist 
might find no way to establish a connection to the views of a Creationist who believes 
that God laid fossils in the earth’s crust. A Democrat might find every conciliatory 
remark made by a Republican to constitute proof of an effort to manipulate.  
At one level, we might express frustration that the arguments are not resolved. At 
a higher level, accompanied by the further reasoning required for a state of learned 
ignorance, we might realize that each argument is impermeable to reason in its own 
terms, and take satisfaction in drawing that stable, reasoned conclusion. This would not 
be a conclusion to the argument; it would be a conclusion about the argument. It would 
transcend ordinary reasoning, in approximately the way Cusa described. The danger is in 
coming to that ending point prematurely, and giving up on real opportunities for 
argumentation. But the possibility of bad judgment is not an indictment of the concept of 
learned ignorance.  
 Learned ignorance, then, is a settled state of argument, akin to consensus and 
dissensus but not to being “unresolved.” We achieve this state when we realize that the 
argument before us cannot be settled, given our mutual commitment stores and capacity 
to reason. Learned ignorance is not disappointment or avoidance. It is a satisfying 
inability to resolve an argument on its original terms. 
 
         Link to commentary 
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